Jamshid Eshaghi
Jamshid Eshaghi (born July 7, 1961, in Ahvaz, Iran) is an Iranian Brigadier general and a senior financial officer in Iran's military establishment.[1] He serves as the chief of the Office of Budget and Financial Affairs within Iran's Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS), the top command coordinating the nation's military branches.[1] In this capacity, Eshaghi has been responsible for managing military finances and budgets, which in Iran often means leveraging oil resources for funding defense projects. Iranian authorities have increasingly allocated crude oil directly to the armed forces in lieu of cash budget, enabling military entities to sell that oil to finance their operations.[2] As a high-ranking official (equivalent to a deputy planning director in the General Staff), Eshaghi is one of the most senior Iranian figures to be targeted by recent international sanctions.[2]
Involvement with Sepehr Energy and affiliates
Eshaghi is closely linked to Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars, a Tehran-based oil company identified by U.S. officials as a front for Iran's military.[3] In fact, Sepehr Energy is described as a cover company operating on behalf of the AFGS and Iran's Ministry of Defense (MODAFL) to covertly sell Iranian oil abroad.[4] Brigadier General Eshaghi previously served as an official of Sepehr Energy and is said to directly oversee its operations for the armed forces.[5] An investigative report by Iran International revealed that Sepehr Energy established a network of shell companies, including subsidiaries like Sepehr Energy Hamta Pars, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Taban, and Sepehr Energy Paya Gostar Jahan, to mask the military's role in oil deals.[5][6] These affiliates facilitated shipments of Iranian crude oil to buyers in Asia while sharing many of the same personnel with Sepehr Energy.[5] For example, one Sepehr affiliate arranged the delivery of nearly two million barrels of Iranian crude oil to China in January 2025 alone.[5] Internal documents and communications (exposed via Iran International) have indicated direct ties between Sepehr Energy's dealings and Iran's armed forces, including contracts bearing military guarantees for oil shipments, despite public denials by company officials.[6]
Ties to the IRGC and oil sale operations
Eshaghi's activities in Sepehr's oil network brought him into cooperation with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), especially in illicit crude sales to China. According to the U.S. Treasury, Brig. Gen. Eshaghi coordinated with the IRGC on the sale of Iranian crude oil to the People's Republic of China.[5] The IRGC has itself taken an expanding role in Iran's oil exports. A late-2024 investigation by Reuters reported that the IRGC had "tightened their grip" on the country's oil industry, secretly controlling up to 50% of Iran's oil exports through shadow tankers, logistics networks, and front companies (many selling oil at steep discounts to Chinese buyers)reuters.comreuters.com. This oil-smuggling enterprise, originally established years ago under IRGC Quds Force commanders, has become a major source of revenue used to fund Iran's military projects and proxy forces.[7] Eshaghi's role, liaising between the AFGS (and by extension the conventional military) and the IRGC's clandestine oil trade, positioned him as a crucial facilitator in monetizing Iranian oil outside of official channels. Eshaghi helped to integrate the armed forces' budgetary needs with the IRGC's covert export network, ensuring proceeds from "off-the-books" oil sales reached Iran's defense institutions.[5][2]
International sanctions and designations
Jamshid Eshaghi's involvement in these activities has led to his designation under international sanctions, principally by the United States. On February 6, 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Eshaghi as part of a major action against an Iranian oil-smuggling network.[5] He was blacklisted alongside several other individuals and entities linked to Sepehr Energy, with OFAC citing that Eshaghi had "acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sepehr Energy".[5] This designation was made under the U.S. counterterrorism authority Executive Order 13224, effectively categorizing him as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) due to the financial support his activities provide to IRGC-linked terrorism and militant groups.[1][5] Notably, Iran's IRGC and its Quds Force are themselves U.S.-designated terrorist organizations, which is why facilitating their oil revenue can trigger a terrorism-based sanction. The U.S. also referenced Executive Order 13902 in Eshaghi's designation, an authority targeting Iran's petroleum sector.[5][3]
Under these sanctions, any of Eshaghi's assets under U.S. jurisdiction are frozen, and U.S. persons (including banks) are prohibited from doing business with him.[3] Moreover, OFAC assigned Eshaghi a "secondary sanctions risk" warning.[1] This means that foreign (non-U.S.) institutions that knowingly facilitate significant transactions for him could themselves face U.S. sanctions, a powerful disincentive for international companies and banks to have any dealings involving Eshaghi or his associated entities. In practical terms, Eshaghi has been cut off from the formal global financial system: he cannot travel freely to many countries, open bank accounts abroad, or engage in cross-border trade without risking asset seizures or enforcement actions. The U.S. Treasury press release announcing the move emphasized that Iran's armed forces, through fronts like Sepehr, generate "hundreds of millions of dollars" from oil sales to fund destabilizing activities (from missile development to regional militias), and that Washington is committed to disrupting these revenue streams.[5] Indeed, U.S. officials pointed out that the oil shipments coordinated by Eshaghi and others were conducted on behalf of the AFGS and were funneling money into Iran's military expansion.[8]
As of this writing, European authorities and the United Nations have not publicly listed Eshaghi for sanctions. The European Union has sanctioned various IRGC and MODAFL-linked entities over the years (especially related to Iran's nuclear program and regional aggression), but Eshaghi's name does not appear in EU sanction documents to date. Nonetheless, the U.S. measures, given their extraterritorial reach, significantly limit Eshaghi's international dealings. Regional media outlets have widely covered the case; for instance, Iran's state-affiliated press condemned the U.S. sanctions as "illegitimate and unlawful" even as opposition-run media highlighted Eshaghi as the highest-ranking Iranian officer hit in that sanctions round.[2][9] Western news services like Reuters and Al Jazeera framed the sanctions against Eshaghi and the Sepehr network as part of President Donald Trump's renewed "maximum pressure" campaign upon returning to office, aimed at cutting Iran's oil exports to zero and curbing funds for its missile and nuclear programs.[8][10]
See also
- Majid Azami
- Sepehr Energy Jahan
- Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
- Persian Gulf Star Oil Company
- National Iranian Oil Company
References
- ^ a b c d "Counter Terrorism Designations; Iran-related Designations; RSS Feed Retirement | Office of Foreign Assets Control". ofac.treasury.gov. Retrieved 2025-05-19.
- ^ a b c d "آمریکا در اولین اقدام پس از فرمان اجرایی ترامپ، تحریمهای نفتی جدیدی علیه تهران وضع کرد". www.iranintl.com (in Persian). 2025-02-06. Retrieved 2025-05-19.
- ^ a b c "OFAC sanctions network that enabled the shipment of Iranian oil to the PRC". Willkie Compliance Concourse. Retrieved 2025-05-19.
- ^ "Treasury Targets Large Iranian Military Financial Facilitation Networks". U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2025-02-08. Retrieved 2025-05-19.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k "Treasury Targets Oil Network Generating Hundreds of Millions of Dollars for Iran's Military". U.S. Department of the Treasury. 2025-02-08. Retrieved 2025-05-19.
- ^ a b Anvari, Amirhadi (2025-05-12). "Iranian military front company masked identity to sell oil, documents show". www.iranintl.com. Retrieved 2025-05-19.
- ^ Saul, Jonathan; Parisa, Hafezi (December 17, 2024). "Iran's Revolutionary Guards extend control over Tehran's oil exports, sources say". Reuters.
- ^ a b Gardner, Timothy (February 6, 2025). "US slaps sanctions on network shipping Iranian oil to China". Reuters.
- ^ "Iran dismisses talks with US as it blasts new sanctions". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2025-05-19.
- ^ Al Jazeera Staff. "Trump administration imposes first Iran sanctions since taking office". Al Jazeera. Retrieved 2025-05-19.