Dominican–Spanish Treaty (1855)

The Dominican–Spanish Treaty (1855) (Spanish: Tratado Dominico-Español de 1855) was an international treaty between the Dominican Republic and the Kingdom of Spain. This treaty, signed on February 8, 1855, marked Spain's formal recognition of the independent nation, which had finally declared its sovereignty in 1844.

The first attempts to annex all or part of Dominican territory to another country occurred during the period prior to the so-called short-lived independence of Santo Domingo, proclaimed bloodlessly on December 1, 1821. Indeed, people of color in some border towns even proposed annexation to the Kingdom of Haiti established by Henri Christophe, but Dominican authorities discovered the plot in time and thwarted it. "The racial component of the revolt, the proximity of the Haitian threat, and the annexation attempts described above motivated the harsh repression of the ringleaders," who were sentenced to death. Historian Pinto Tortosa emphasizes that through this punishment, the governor of Santo Domingo "attempted to dissuade the rest of the Dominican slaves from imitating those conspirators," although this contributed to "multiplying protests in the following years."^[1] When Haiti occupied the newly independent state in early 1822, its troops encountered no resistance, largely because the new regime had not abolished slavery.

On February 27, 1844, the Dominican Republic finally separated from Haiti, and from then on, the country was subject to numerous interferences from the major powers with interests in the Caribbean: the United States, Great Britain, France, and Spain. In fact, these foreign interventions in Dominican domestic politics were a direct or indirect consequence of the rivalry between European countries, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other. However, the former held different positions regarding North American expansion, especially depending on the changing circumstances of each situation, as analyzed in greater detail throughout this work. Due to the power struggles between the two main local leaders, Pedro Santana and Buenaventura Báez, this interference was then more closely linked than ever to domestic affairs. It is also important to emphasize the effects of a draft treaty between the Dominican Republic and the United States, which allowed the concession of a port to the United States Navy on the northern coast of the island, specifically in the strategic Samaná Bay. This eventuality represented a threat to Haiti, which feared possible attacks and even invasion by the United States if the country, as a slave-owning power, considered it advantageous for its own expansion to occupy Haitian territory.

In this situation, the Dominican Republic's armed resistance to its neighbor, with several military campaigns from 1844 to 1856, was another of the main reasons for the beginning of foreign intervention in island affairs, under the pretext of diplomatic mediation between the two countries. Haiti's then president-for-life, Faustin Soulouque, who shortly afterward crowned himself emperor and reigned as Faustin I from 1849 to 1859, launched an attack against the Dominican Republic in March 1849 to prevent its recognition by France and Great Britain. However, his attempted invasion ended once again with the resounding defeat of the Haitian army at the Battle of Las Carreras, which took place on April 21 of the same year.

Indeed, the commissioners sent by the Santo Domingo government to Europe managed to sign a treaty with France on October 22, 1848, which ultimately failed to be ratified by the French legislative assembly due to protests from Haiti. At the same time, Dominican diplomatic representatives had entered into negotiations with Great Britain, which presented them with a draft treaty in November of that year. This treaty also failed to be signed, but in this case, the reason was a specific disagreement that the commissioners had to discuss with their government. Despite this obstacle, Robert Hermann Schomburgk was appointed British consul in Santo Domingo, a city where the French consul, Victor Place, and the United States commercial agent, Jonathan Elliot, had already been stationed since August 1848.

Santana assumed the presidency of the Republic for the second time on February 15, 1853, after taking the constitutional oath before Congress and in Baez's presence. This peaceful transfer of power took place according to the provisions of the Constitution, despite the difficult circumstances arising from the increasingly bitter confrontation between the two main actors in that political situation, former President Báez and General Santana himself. However, the positions of both were very similar, since the already chronic situation of internal political instability and the latent threat posed by Haiti's aggressive stance to the survival of the Dominican Republic led both leaders to seek support from the governments of other countries, particularly Spain, France, Great Britain, and the United States, resulting in permanent external interference in almost all of its affairs.

Thus, even before Dominican independence, negotiations began with Spain in 1843 through nearby Cuba, and as early as 1844, immediately after the proclamation of the Republic, through the Governor of Puerto Rico, Santiago Méndez de Vigo. For years, the Madrid government vacillated "over the path to follow," although it "took some interest in the matter" on occasion, such as when French Prime Minister François Guizot, "who preferred not to intervene directly in the Dominican-Haitian dispute," encouraged the Spanish authorities to defend French interests in the area "at their own expense." France would "acce the Spanish protectorate" and would oppose "any other power acquiring supremacy over the island," a move England agreed to, although nothing was ever done. Then, "seeing that Spain was undecided," Santana sent José María Caminero to Washington in 1845 to negotiate a recognition treaty with the United States, but these efforts also failed.^[2]

The next attempt was the "first official negotiating mission," sent to Madrid in September 1846, chaired by Báez. Its objective was to have Spain, France, and Great Britain "recognize Dominican independence" in exchange for the signing of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation. However, after fifteen months, Báez's commission left Madrid without any success, as negotiations were never opened, "nor were its proposals taken into consideration." Spanish Prime Minister Juan Prim, during his mandate in Puerto Rico (1847-1848), pointed out to Ramón María Narváez the advisability of annexing the eastern part of Hispaniola, citing "the prevailing internal instability" in the Dominican Republic and "the prospect of strategically strengthening" Spanish possessions in the Caribbean. Shortly after Báez's accession to the presidency, attempts were directed toward France, which declined the former's offer of a protectorate, forcing the president to "direct his requests" toward Washington. At the same time, he entrusted the priest Elías Rodríguez with the task of traveling to Havana, along with the Spanish merchant Juan Abril, to explain to Federico de Roncali, the Governor of Cuba, "the dangers that a permanent American presence in the Dominican Republic would entail." In fact, in the speech he gave in February 1853 to report on his administration before Congress, Báez "referred to the dangers that threatened Spanish sovereignty in Cuba" and expressed "the advisability of strengthening relations with Spain."^[3]

Abril, acting as a confidential agent in Santo Domingo, informed Valentín Cañedo, Captain General of Cuba, of the formation of the new Dominican government and informed him of the efforts he had made, in agreement with the French consul in that city, to prevent Manuel Joaquín del Monte's inclusion in the executive branch due to his sympathies toward the United States. The aforementioned agent explained his actions in these terms: "I attach great importance to the ministry in case our government does not soon decide to enter into some agreement and it is necessary or necessary to maintain influence over the destiny of this country." In another matter, Abril informed Cañedo of a confidential letter from Jean-François-Maxime Raybaud, French consul in Port-au-Prince, in which he indicated that Great Britain wanted to "withdraw from the mediation" it had been developing with France to facilitate a peaceful understanding between the two countries on the island. Naturally, this possibility made Santana worried, even more so after learning the news that Emperor Faustin I was preparing his troops for a new invasion of Dominican territory.^[4]

Indeed, the British government's attitude seemed to be changing, as Santana himself conveyed to Cañedo in March 1853. Cañedo communicated the contents of Santana's letter to Roncali, who on April 14 resigned as head of the Spanish government, where he was replaced by General Francisco de Lersundi y Hormaechea, who remained in that position until September of that year. Cañedo noted Santana's misgivings about "an imminent attack by the Haitians" and "his lack of confidence in the mediation of England and France to prevent it." Cañedo added that, according to what Abril had informed him, the sincerity of the former's offers to continue mediating was "more than doubtful for the Dominican government" and that, in the absence of other support or mediation to prevent Haitian aggressions, the Dominicans would be forced to seek help from any other nation, including the United States, "no matter how much they detested filibustering."^[5] Santana also addressed to Fernando Norzagaray y Escudero, the governor of Puerto Rico, that same month, asking for his help in case an attack by Soulouque broke the fragile truce between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, which did not occur until late 1855.

Despite the fears expressed by both Santana and Raybaud regarding the continued Franco-British mediation, the latter traveled to Santo Domingo with the aim of confirming to the president "the guarantees offered to the Republic by the mediating powers [sic], guarantees represented by the letters patent" that Queen Victoria of England had signed on May 13, and the Emperor of France on the 28th of the same month. In these, both monarchs assured Santana that "their desire was to maintain the independence and prosperity" of the Dominican Republic, and that for this reason "they were prepared to make the greatest efforts to prevent the continuation of Haitian aggression."^[6] Such flattering news could not help but greatly reassure Santana and his government, as they saw themselves somehow protected from the threat of a new invasion by Haiti.

President Santana, determined to launch a diplomatic offensive in several European countries with which he hoped to establish or improve existing relations, sent his Minister of Foreign Affairs to France with the mission of restoring normal relations between the two governments. These relations had been somewhat strained as a result of an incident that had led to the expulsion of two French subjects accused of spying for Haiti. On November 15, 1853, Santana appointed Manuel Joaquín del Monte as the representative of the Dominican government to sign a treaty with the Netherlands. This treaty was signed on the island of Curaçao, where the governor acted as the Dominican representative.

On December 10 of that same year, Santana appointed General Matías Ramón Mella as a confidential agent with negotiating powers and assigned him to Spain, where he was to "unite the interests of both countries, in the belief that once this objective was achieved, the tranquility and future of the Dominican people would be assured,"^[7] as the Dominican Minister of Foreign Affairs told his Spanish counterpart on that date. Finally, another commissioner was charged with concluding a treaty similar to the previous ones with the Kingdom of Sardinia. Santana asked Norzagaray to recommend Mella to the Spanish government, after explaining the mission the general was to perform in Spain:^[8]

The desire [...] to prevent foreign influences from threatening the stability of things has forced me to send General Mella [...] to the government of His Majesty in order to express [...] my complete willingness to adopt an effective means to guarantee the security of this island [...]. I believe that Your Excellency will take an interest in this population, which is linked to the fate of that island and that of Cuba, by its same religion, customs, habits, and especially by its geographical location.

In his reply to Santana, Norzagaray conveyed a favorable opinion of the reception Mella's mission would receive from the Spanish government, while accepting his request for a recommendation. The governor even ventured to assure him that "if the hour of danger for the Dominican Republic should arrive," regardless of where it came from, Spain would not leave it "abandoned to its own forces."^[9] In one of the letters he provided to Mella to serve as an introduction upon his arrival, addressed to General Manuel de la Pezuela, Norzagaray more openly expressed his thoughts regarding the proposals the Dominican commissioner had been ordered to present to the Spanish government:^[10]

Since the Dominican Republic is not recognized by us, [...] I do not believe that the current government's claim is acceptable without prior recognition of its independence, even if it were assumed. I believe that the protectorate would bring us some benefit, but many inconveniences with respect to other nations; and I also believe that even greater inconveniences would be caused by once again dominating that territory [...]; but if both of these things would not bring us any benefit, I also believe that it would be a grave evil for [...] Cuba and Puerto Rico if Haiti were to reconquer its neighboring Republic of Santo Domingo, or if the Americans were to take possession of it, whether through annexation, protectorate, or any other means. For this reason [...] I support the Dominican government's demands for support and the stability of its republic to be guaranteed, not in the sense that Spain will declare itself its protector, but rather that the nations that have colonies in this archipelago will confederate [...] in the sense that the state of affairs on the nearby island of Santo Domingo will continue to prevail.

Ángel Calderón de la Barca, who had been Spain's ambassador to Washington for many years and was therefore familiar with the Dominican issue, was appointed Minister of State when the Sartorius cabinet was formed. On February 18, 1854, Mella and Calderón held their first meeting, during which Santana's envoy proposed the two options his government considered most appropriate: a protectorate or recognition of independence by Spain. Before ending their meeting, Mella insisted that Santana wished to avoid the prospect of having to accept any other protection out of sheer necessity.

After the second meeting between the two, on March 13, Calderón drafted a report on Mella's mission, addressed to the Prime Minister. In it, he stated that he was certain that the United States would oppose Spain's protectorate in Santo Domingo, "especially the Democratic Party," which was at the head of Washington's executive branch and a staunch defender of the "maximum policy known in that country as the Monroe Doctrine." The Minister of State also anticipated that this opposition would be accompanied by that of the British government, due to its policy of "always fearful of provoking conflicts" with the Americans. Regarding France, he warned of the influence that "its relations with the Empire of Haiti would have on the way it considered the question of the Spanish protectorate" on the other side of the island. Finally, Calderón summarized his presentation in the following points:^[11]

1. That Spain cannot grant a physical protectorate to the Dominican Republic due to the difficulty of exercising it and the costs and certain commitments it would entail.

2. That recognition of the independence of said Republic would be premature and without compensation.

3. That it is extremely important and urgent to prevent it from being conquered by the blacks of Haiti or from throwing itself into the arms of American filibusters.

4. That it would be advisable to discuss this matter and agree on a solution [...] with the friendly powers that have overseas possessions.

5. That for now, without destroying or encouraging Commissioner General Mella's hopes regarding recognition of independence, an unofficial agent could be sent to Santo Domingo to inform this ministry [...] about the situation of the Republic.

The opinions of Norzagaray and the Minister of State were quite similar, as both agreed that the fundamental objective of Spanish diplomacy in the Antilles was the preservation of the independence of the Dominican Republic. However, the basic premise guiding this policy was to always keep an eye on finding the best possible solution to protect Cuba and Puerto Rico from the expansionist tendencies of the United States, as well as the need to act primarily through an agreement with France and Great Britain.

In April 1854, Calderón addressed a communication to the Spanish ambassadors in Paris and London, informing them of the efforts Mella was undertaking in Madrid on behalf of his government. The minister emphasized the importance of taking precautions, as far as possible, against the imminent risk the Dominican Republic faced if the European powers did not come to its aid: both of being invaded by Haiti and of falling into the hands of the United States, whose government was seeking to seize Samaná Bay. Faced with this dual threat, Mella spoke "without hesitation of his government's resolve to implore the protection of the United States rather than fall prey to the Emperor of Haiti." Therefore, Spain considered it necessary for the two great European nations to avoid such an eventuality. In his instructions, Calderón requested that both diplomats inform him of the position of the French and British governments on this matter, as the Spanish government wished to proceed in accordance with theirs.(12)

First, the Spanish representative in London responded that George Villiers, the 4th Earl of Clarendon, who was in charge of the Foreign Office, had told him that his government would not be indifferent to the United States taking over Samaná, and that he considered it quite right that the Spanish government had abstained from granting a protectorate that would have involved it in commitments and expenditures.(13)

For Pezuela, in response to the letter he had received from Mella, informed him that the French Foreign Minister, Édouard Drouyn de L'Huys, had expressed France's keen interest in the free existence of the Dominican Republic. In their conversation, the minister stated that "the Dominican Republic was not abandoned to the protection of maritime powers," and assured him that neither France nor Great Britain would allow the Dominican Republic to increase the dominions of the United States, and that neither sought "any new acquisition." Pezuela concluded by stating that only Spain had the right to reincorporate Dominican territory into its dominions, but that the circumstances in which it found itself could perhaps prolong "the time for a satisfactory conclusion to the current situation." In any case, the Spanish ambassador in Paris made it clear to Mella that "the government of His Catholic Majesty" was "the only one" to whom he could "address himself on this matter."(14)

As the ambassador's words suggested, the Spanish government's response to Mella's successive demands was always the same refusal to take a decisive step, expressing Spain's sympathy for Santo Domingo but avoiding "granting the requested recognition." In his last attempt to reach an agreement, the Dominican commissioner, seeing that the minister continued to reject both the protectorate option, which was initially requested, and mere diplomatic recognition, proposed to Calderón that the Spanish government limit itself to appointing consular or commercial agents in Santo Domingo and Port-au-Prince. This measure did not imply formal recognition of either of the island's two governments, as was the practice already established by other countries, such as France and the United States, but it was not accepted by the Minister of State either, who judged it "preferable that the aforementioned agents be non-public."(15)

Mella concluded his mission to Spain after addressing the Minister of State again in a letter in which he referred to his memorandum of March 23, in which he had submitted for his consideration the fact that "the imperative need for self-preservation could oblige the Dominican Republic to treat with other nations on the basis of mutual convenience and benefit." Finally, Mella issued a veiled warning by drawing the minister's attention to the possibility that, even if such dealings were not made to the detriment or harm to Spain's interests, it would be enough for them to be made without its consent to entail the possibility that they could one day be hostile to it.(16)

Before leaving the capital, Mella left Rafael María Baralt, a Venezuelan-born writer with a Dominican mother who lived in Spain and was a naturalized Spaniard, in charge of continuing the business. He then departed for Puerto Rico at the end of May. Once in Santo Domingo, Mella presented a report to the Dominican Minister of Foreign Affairs on the results of his negotiations in Madrid, stating the following:(17)

1. That Spain fervently desires that the Republic exist and prosper separate from the power of Haiti, as a free nation independent of all foreign domination;

2. That for the moment it is not even possible to seriously address the recognition of independence; 3. However, it does not disregard the fate of the Dominican people so much that it ceases to regard them in its international relations as the most natural friend and ally it has in the Antilles [...];

4. And finally, that the negotiations, far from having been broken off, are still pending, awaiting calmer and more opportune moments.

The Spanish government's attitude had been largely determined by the difficult internal situation the country was experiencing at the time, particularly as a result of the revolts and riots that were occurring in various cities following a failed uprising against the government in Zaragoza in February 1854. These problems were not, however, the only ones that captured the attention of the government and public opinion in Spain, as tensions also continued to arise in its relations with the United States, such as the incident involving the Black Warrior, a ship accused of smuggling that was seized by Spanish authorities in Cuba and later released due to protests from the American government. The United States ambassador in Madrid, Pierre Soulé, had instructions from William L. Marcy, the American Secretary of State, to propose the sale of Cuba to the Spanish government, an offer that was, of course, rejected.

In any case, the situation in the Dominican Republic did not seem so desperate as to require an immediate resolution, which could prove embarrassing due to the hostile reactions of some players in the Caribbean game, such as Cuban slaveholders or the island's independence and annexationists, coupled with the reluctance and even outright opposition it would likely arouse among various nations with interests in the area, such as the United States or the European powers, not to mention Haiti.

A few months later, Spanish policy toward the Dominican Republic underwent a shift, not only due to the rise to power of the progressives following the revolutionary events of the summer of 1854. The explanation must rather be found in a draft treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic, which stipulated, as an indispensable condition for the former, the leasing of a piece of land in Samaná Bay for an indefinite period in exchange for a small annual rent, with the supposed objective of establishing a coal depot there to supply its ships.

In any case, it is indisputable that between 1856 and 1858, and even since 1854, when the Puritan doctrinaire Joaquín Francisco Pacheco and General Leopoldo O'Donnell held the portfolios of State and War, respectively, in the administrative positions of the Ministry of State, aligned with the newly created Liberal Union, a "policy of prestige" was advocated. This was based on promoting "a naval force to support the negotiations then being held between Spain and certain Ibero-American republics." According to Jover Zamora, in this regard, a distinction can also be made between the progressives, who favored "a realist policy" toward these countries through "the promotion of trade relations," and the moderates, but especially "the unionists," who favored building a large fleet. This should bear witness to the Spanish-American nations "the power of the former metropolis," which would also indirectly serve to strengthen, in their eyes, "Spain's position in the last redoubts" of its empire.(18)

However, the causes of "the Unionist government's repeated 'vocation' toward foreign affairs" have often been trivialized, as numerous authors, taking Jover's interpretation to the extreme, consider that all of its colonial and military interventions were "subordinated to the expansionism of other European powers," primarily France. Historian Martínez Gallego points out that the causality of such actions "is usually reduced to motivations of prestige, the consolidation of an internal nationalism gained through contrast with the outside world, the diversion of internal problems, the promotion of the military establishment, a romantic spirit, and even a sense of crime." However, there is no doubt that Spanish foreign policy during this period prioritized "the safeguarding of its colonial possessions" and slavery, "the 'particular institution' that made the dominant sector of the Cuban economy function." This author concludes that Santo Domingo, like the other "colonial or military milestones" of the Liberal Union government period, had been "a part of the protective mesh" woven to protect the Antillean colonies, so that, if these "were called pearls", the Unionist foreign policy should be seen as "their shell".(19)

For his part, historian Inarejos Muñoz points out that "the progressive difficulties imposed on the slave trade and the dynamics of the metropolis and its colonies, mediated by instability on the peninsula and the outbreak of uprisings in Cuba, were decisive" in the design and implementation of the policy pursued by the governments of the Liberal Union. The aforementioned author describes as "platitudes" the accusations of "incoherence and lack of objectives" leveled by classical historiography on this period against the various Unionist interventions abroad, and considers them to be "prejudices largely derived from the lack of an overall analysis" of each campaign, as well as the relationships between them. Inarejos also points out that "precisely this interconnection between campaigns became a constant in the Liberal Union's foreign interventions," and his criticisms focus on those, like Jover, who insist on "the supposed sterility, incoherence, and romanticism of Unionist foreign policy.”

Muñoz also disagrees with Álvarez Junco, whose work "delves into some of the aforementioned commonplaces" by studying "the attempt at imperial expansion and the failure to obtain territorial gains." In Inarejos's opinion, however, "a careful analysis of O'Donnell's foreign policy confirms that the priority was the preservation of existing possessions." Regarding "the motives that guided its foreign interventions," Álvarez Junco affirms that Spain acted "motivated solely by the defense of national 'honor'—unlike other powers that pursued material interests."(20) In short, the foreign and colonial policy of the Liberal Union spared no expense when intervening in the Pacific or in the vicinity of threatened Caribbean territories. Viewed from this perspective, it is perhaps no longer so easy to simply refer to a policy of prestige, without further nuance.

Jonathan Elliott, the United States commercial agent in Santo Domingo, sent a communication to his superiors in December 1853 in which he anticipated that if Mella's efforts in Spain failed, which he considered highly probable, the Dominican government and people would request the protection of the United States. The American government wasted no time, and Secretary of State Marcy sent General Cazneau to the Dominican Republic in January 1854, tasked with investigating both the country's conditions and its government's attitude toward the signing of a treaty between the two nations. The American authorities chose an individual with a shady background, linked to the annexation of Texas to the United States, to perform these pseudo-diplomatic functions.

Within the Pierce cabinet, Secretary Marcy can be considered the principal defender of the doctrine of manifest destiny, which, as is well known, advocates for U.S. territorial expansion to the south, "especially toward the Antilles." Therefore, Marcy "was easily persuaded of the advantages offered by the annexation of Santo Domingo" (21) and also convinced American President Franklin Pierce. The opportunity presented to them to carry out this plan was unbeatable, considering the situation in Europe due to the Crimean War, where Great Britain and France were on the verge of military involvement.

Cazneau quickly realized that the Dominican government was very interested in strengthening its ties with the United States through a diplomatic recognition treaty. Indeed, until that point, Santana's administration had been forced to "rely on the goodwill of France and England to enjoy the temporary relief of the existing truce with Haiti," as Cazneau wrote to Marcy shortly after his arrival in Santo Domingo. Elsewhere in his communication, he stated that Mella's mission to Madrid was "unimportant," although the general opinion was that its objective was to negotiate "the return of the Dominican Republic to submission to the Spanish monarchy." According to his conclusions, Santana's "predominant policy" was to place the country "preferably under the protection of the United States."(22)

Along with his appointment as special agent, Cazneau had received the necessary powers to begin negotiating a treaty with the Dominican government. After completing this assignment, he returned to Washington to present it to Marcy. Marcy introduced a new clause into the project, which eventually became its true purpose: the leasing of a square mile of land in Samaná for the construction of a coaling station for use by American warships. The Secretary of State attached such importance to this point that, in his new instructions to Cazneau, Marcy indicated that if the treaty was not accepted in its entirety by the United States Senate, he would not approve it either, in the unlikely event that the Washington administration ever submitted it for ratification.

In a report from the General Directorate of Overseas of November 1854, an account was given of the letter sent by the governor of Puerto Rico on July 1, where he warned that, according to news received from the Spanish agent in Santo Domingo:(23)

The American General Cazneau was once again on said island, and although up until then he had not presented any proposal to the president or his government, it was assumed with some basis that his return was intended to propose an immigration of Americans through the Samaná Peninsula [...], to which the current leader of the republic would not accede until he received a response to the proposals he had made to our government through his envoy [...]; however, considering how little satisfaction [...] Mella had with the result of his commission, it would not be surprising if Cazneau at that time succeeded [...] in his aims of annexing the island of Santo Domingo to the American Union, in which case our position would be very critical, and it would not be easy to prevent the consequences that could arise over time due to its proximity, since any treaty concluded between the two would not benefit our interests at all.

Norzagaray's final recommendation, as recorded in the same report, was that, before completely rejecting Mella's proposals, "everything should be taken into account to issue a resolution" that would allow for the consolidation of peace and tranquility in Puerto Rico and Cuba. The information that Agent Abril provided to the governor of Puerto Rico left no doubt about the U.S. commissioner's intentions.(24)

Thus, in another communication he addressed to the President of the Council of Ministers on July 31, 1854, Norzagaray insisted on the need to rectify the Spanish government's stance toward the Dominican Republic. The objective was to prevent the Dominican Republic, "despite its sympathies and the interest shown until now," from seeking refuge in the United States, "eager to acquire preponderance and domination in the Antilles," given the impossibility of maintaining its current position and needing another, more powerful nation to protect it. If decisive action was not taken to prevent this possibility, the governor warned in a somewhat dramatic tone: "Not only will we, but also the nations of Europe that have colonies here, have to suffer the consequences of what they fear today because of the ambition of a powerful state that [...] aspires to dominate all these countries."(25)

The consuls of France and Great Britain were instructed to oppose by all means the signing of any treaty that would entail the cession of a portion of Dominican territory to the United States, to which Santana had already agreed. On September 8, 1854, both consuls threatened the president with withdrawal from the mediation between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The diplomatic pressure was very intense and was supported, more or less symbolic, by the arrival of a British warship in the port of Santo Domingo. Under these circumstances, Santana had no choice but to yield to these demands and remove the clause regarding Samaná. Despite this, Cazneau and two representatives of the Dominican government signed the treaty on October 5, 1854.

However, even after the elimination of this clause, signing the treaty entailed a certain risk of leaving the Dominican Republic unprotected against Haiti. This requires an explanation that perhaps lies in Santana's desire "to overcome exclusive dependence on France and England," countries he considered supporters of Báez, in which he was not entirely wrong. For this reason, Santana's efforts can be interpreted as an attempt to "create a balance abroad," which would have been "reflected to his benefit in the political situation of the Republic,(26) which at the time was not favorable to him." Indeed, the opposition to Santana's regime remained increasingly active after the controversial Article 210 was removed from the new constitution promulgated in February 1854, which had allowed for the expansion of public liberties.

Meanwhile, the Spanish government was preparing to take a much more active role in Dominican affairs, and the first step it took in this direction was to appoint Eduardo San Just as commercial agent in Santo Domingo. Minister of State Joaquín Pacheco indicated in the instructions he gave to the new agent that his assignment was "of the greatest interest for the preservation of Cuba," since the geographic location of the Dominican Republic would make it very dangerous for the United States to seize control of it. The main objective of the mission entrusted to San Just was to "use all possible means" to hinder North American projects. To this end, he had to "revive Santana's hope" and his confidence in Spain by making him understand that the Madrid government wished to strengthen relations with that of Santo Domingo, of which the dispatch of a commercial agent was a good example. The Spanish government went further in its displays of interest in gaining maximum influence on the island, and stated that it was willing to "recognize the independence" of the Dominican Republic if it were willing to send an agent to Madrid. Finally, Pacheco instructed San Just to seek "to utilize the influence of the consular agents of France and England, interested in putting a stop to invasions by the American Union," to counter its "ambitious plans."(27)

The decision to appoint a commercial agent in Santo Domingo preceded news conveyed by Cueto, the Spanish ambassador in Washington, who reported on the intentions supposedly guiding the latest movements of the Americans in the Dominican Republic. In a communication addressed to the Minister of State on September 2, 1854, Cueto stated the following:(28)

The eagerness that a portion of Congress and the people are expressing here [...] to establish a naval base in the aforementioned bay (of Samaná) and even to convert the entire island of Santo Domingo, according to the New York Tribune, into an appendix of the Union, the island's geographical location between Cuba and Puerto Rico; the sending of [...] a negotiator; are considerations that His Majesty's government should not, in my opinion, lose sight of.

In view of these events, the ambassador recommended "the immediate appointment" of two representatives as mere commercial agents, which did not imply any recognition, in Port-au-Prince and Santo Domingo. The objective was for them to "join the mediation work" carried out by France and Great Britain between the two states on the island, "and to monitor and hinder the efforts" made by the Washington administration "to establish its influence there." On October 5, 1854, the British ambassador in Madrid, Lord Howden, informed Pacheco of the response he had received from the Earl of Clarendon, Secretary of the Foreign Office, along the lines suggested by Howden himself. The latter had recommended that he instruct the British consul in Santo Domingo, in conjunction with the agent the Spanish government was soon to send to that island, to discourage the Dominican government from any intention of allowing Americans to settle in Samaná. The British ambassador also expressed to Pacheco his fear that the treaty between the Dominican Republic and the United States concealed the objective of "facilitating the dispatch of numerous emigrants from the Confederation" and, imitating the example of what had happened in Texas, would "cause the nationality of the country's natives to disappear."(29)

In addition to using diplomatic tools, the Spanish government seemed prepared to adopt other, more forceful measures to try to prevent the aforementioned emigration from taking place, as can be deduced from the dispatch that José Gutiérrez de la Concha, the new Captain General of Cuba, sent to the Minister of State. In it, de la Concha indicated that, in accordance with the latest orders received by his predecessor, he had arranged for "a warship with the appropriate instructions" to depart within a few days for the Dominican coast. The commander of the ship had instructions to make Santana understand the Spanish government's willingness to "recognize that Republic and strengthen relations with it," but he was also to inform him that the ratification of the treaty with the United States for the cession of part of Samaná would make this impossible.(30)

In his communication to the Minister of State, the Governor of Cuba enclosed a copy of the letter sent by Abril from Santo Domingo on October 7, 1854, in which the Spanish agent informed him that the Dominican government had "concluded and signed the treaty with the plenipotentiary of the Union, and ceded a portion of Samaná for a number of years." Abril then wrote that the Santo Domingo executive branch had convened the legislative chamber for November 1, but claimed to be certain it would not meet. This would be "the pretext for its dissolution, a change in fundamental law, extraordinary powers for the executive branch, that is, a dictatorship," thereby secretly sanctioning the treaty. At the end of his dispatch, Abril launched a veiled reproach at the previous Spanish governments, lamenting their lack of initiative with these words: "I fear that too much reliance has been placed on the commitment of the European powers to maintain the status quo in the Antilles." He also subtly criticized the new executive in Madrid, stating immediately afterward: "I cannot understand how our government views this issue [...]; at the moments when I most need instructions, they tell me nothing."(31)

Although the clause regarding the cession of Samaná was ultimately excluded from the treaty between the Dominican Republic and the United States, contrary to the information provided by Abril, the representatives of France and Great Britain were not satisfied, as they considered the treaty itself to be a wedge to establish some form of American control over the country, with the complicity of Santana. On October 27, 1854, Raybaud, the French consul in Port-au-Prince, arrived in Santo Domingo and approached Schomburgk about the possibility of declaring a Franco-British protectorate in the Dominican Republic, with the aim of reinstating Báez as president. Ultimately, their course of action against Santana and the treaty focused on pressuring him to submit it to a vote in the Consultative Senate, the official name of the Dominican legislative chamber, which had been convened by the president to discuss the advisability of amending the constitution approved earlier that year. The French and British consuls in Santo Domingo, Darasse and Schomburgk, had sufficient support within the Senate to allow them to introduce a series of amendments to the treaty, thus rendering it unacceptable to the United States government.

In view of the maneuver orchestrated by diplomats from both countries, and after sending them a letter accusing them of interfering in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic, on November 23, 1854, Cazneau attempted to withdraw the treaty from the Senate's agenda. However, it was already too late for this, because once signed, the only legal possibility was for it to be ratified, modified, or rejected by the legislators of both signatory nations. A commission was formed to report to the House on the treaty, headed by Theodore Stanley Heneken, who had acted on previous occasions as an unofficial agent for the British government. This circumstance, not coincidentally, made the consuls' task easier when it came to getting the Senate to vote on a text different from the original.

Thus, at Schomburgk's request, or rather at his request, a significant change was made to Article 3, stipulating that all Dominican citizens, "without distinction of color, would enjoy the same treatment in the United States as American citizens in Santo Domingo."(32) This modification to the treaty guaranteed the United States' refusal to ratify it, given that openly racially discriminatory legislation was in force in the southern United States, in addition to a legal regime of slavery. Although the Senate ultimately rejected the treaty in the vote held on December 5, 1854, Schomburgk and Darasse went further. Indeed, on December 14, both consuls demanded that the Santo Domingo administration accept a series of conditions in exchange for continuing its mediation activities with Soulouque, which Soulouque refused to do, via a note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The first and foremost of these conditions was a formal, written commitment not to grant privileges to any foreign power over others, which, of course, implied not alienating any portion of Dominican territory to the United States.

While the Washington administration could have reacted, even with the use of force, to oppose this interference in its relations with the Dominican Republic, "it was so eager not to antagonize Great Britain" that, immediately after Cazneau communicated "the failure of the treaty due to Anglo-French opposition," it ordered him to return. Moreover, the only thing Santana gained from his "adventure" with the United States was "to earn the ill will of Great Britain and France,"(33) and it can be concluded that this was the "most accomplished assertion of influence" and diplomatic pressure by European powers in the affairs of an American state. In fact, the policy of France and Great Britain in the case of Texas, compared to this, was very weak.(34)

Upon hearing the news of San Just's appointment as Spain's commercial agent in the Dominican Republic, the governor of Puerto Rico expressed his regret in a letter sent to the Minister of State on October 31, 1854, with the following words:(35)

The loss we must experience with the dismissal of the current secret agent, Mr. Juan Abril, since in this capacity alone, but taking advantage of his position, preponderance, and great influence in that country [...] he has provided for many years and is providing services of the greatest importance, [...] preventing before and delaying now, as Your Excellency has seen, the execution of treaties that could be detrimental to the general and particular interests of Spain [...], hindering the meeting of Congress and ultimately contributing to its dissolution.

Furthermore, Norzagaray requested that the government grant him some type of reward that would make it "less painful for him to be unable to openly provide the services he had provided until then, reserved and gratuitous." It is logical to assume that the actions of the Spanish agent, coordinated with those of the British and French consuls, had exerted a decisive influence on the development of the events that took place in Santo Domingo, "either by taking advantage of his many and highly-placed connections among individuals in the Dominican government, or by making use of the enormous influence and importance" he had "with the main figures in the country [...] due to his advantageous position there, and even in Congress."(36)

The role played by Spain in this crisis can also be intuited through a dispatch from the governor of Cuba to the Minister of State, in which he stated that he had learned, thanks to information received from the Spanish ambassador in Washington, that the Spanish government had taken the initiative, supported by England and France, "to prevent the ratification of the treaty" between the Dominican Republic and the United States. In his letter, De la Concha also reported the arrival in Havana of Spain's new commercial agent in Santo Domingo and that the latter, "considering his presence in that port extremely urgent," had departed for that country without delay, stopping in Port-au-Prince, where he could "reach an agreement with the consuls of France and England" who should support him in his mission according to the instructions they received from their governments.(37)

On November 24, 1854, San Just sent his first dispatch from the Dominican capital to the Minister of State, a position that Claudio Antón de Luzuriaga assumed on November 29. The acknowledgment of receipt for this dispatch includes part of the content of the aforementioned dispatch, according to which San Just had received, during his brief stay in Port-au-Prince, "the offer of sincere cooperation from the consuls of France and England." The Minister of Foreign Affairs also expressed to San Just the Haitian government's sympathy for Spain and assured him that he had "the intention of opposing the policy of the Washington cabinet." Luzuriaga conveyed to the Spanish commercial agent his approval of his conduct, while recommending that he always proceed in terms that would lead to establishing good relations between Spain and the two countries that share the island of Santo Domingo, as well as "creating obstacles to the ambitious aims of the American Union."(38)

The Haitian government's reception of Saint Just was not only a sign of its desire to maintain good relations with Spain, but also a means of strengthening the opposition to North American intervention in the island's affairs. In fact, during the period in which the negotiations between Cazneau and the Dominican authorities took place, the French and British consuls in Port-au-Prince "wasted no opportunity to impress the mind of Emperor Faustin I with the danger that the occupation of part of the island by a slave-holding nation" like the United States would pose to his own dominion.(39)

In his second dispatch to the Minister of State, on the same day as the first, San Just reported the delivery to President Santana of the letter accrediting him as Spain's commercial agent in Santo Domingo, a city he had arrived in on November 23. The Revista de Ambos Mundos of Madrid reported on this news in its political chronicle section: (40)

In November, the Spanish commercial agent, Mr. Saint-Just (sic), arrived in Santo Domingo [...]. Received with the utmost cordiality by President Pedro Santana, he obtained the appropriate exequatur the day after his arrival and immediately began to perform his duties to the great joy of the natives, who, always loyal to the old motherland, enthusiastically saluted its flag [...]. Thus, the relations of the peninsula with the island once called, par excellence, the island of Hispaniola have been restored; and now all that is needed is for a good treaty to regularize, strengthen, and perpetuate them.

The Santo Domingo government, encouraged by the presence of Spain's new commercial agent and the invitation extended to it on behalf of his government to begin negotiations leading to the signing of a treaty between the two countries, appointed Rafael María Baralt as extraordinary envoy and minister plenipotentiary of the Dominican Republic in Madrid. While these negotiations were taking place, San Just began his activity by publishing an advertisement in the newspapers inviting "the subjects of His Majesty to enroll in the commercial agency" of Spain. This was approved by Luzuriaga in the communication he sent to Baralt on January 17, 1855.(41)

The measure adopted by San Just, a common diplomatic practice that under normal circumstances would not have had much importance, in that turbulent situation was destined to create serious friction in relations between Spain and the Dominican Republic, especially after the signing of the Dominican-Spanish treaty. The possibility of registering for this registry was seized by many supporters of Báez to act against the Santana government under the protection of Spanish nationality, due to the even more authoritarian and restrictive nature of the new constitutional reform enacted in December 1854. This option was also chosen by a number of people with Spanish relatives, who sought to evade the harsh military obligations imposed by the executive branch on all citizens deemed fit to serve in the army, under the pretext of the ever-present Haitian aggressions.

San Just arrived in Santo Domingo in the midst of the struggle between the consuls of Great Britain and France, on the one hand, and General Cazneau, on the other, over control of the Dominican Republic. The commercial agent immediately began informing the Spanish government about the developments in that country. Thus, on December 10, 1854, San Just warned that U.S. naval forces were expected to "press for an agreement or, failing that, seize Samaná Bay by force," in anticipation of which "France and England would also order their navies in the Antilles to sail toward the island." The commercial agent also communicated this news to the Captain General of Cuba, all so that Spain, "in a matter of such great interest," could "assist the forces of both nations."(42)

In his response to San Just's dispatch, Luzuriaga emphasized the fundamental guidelines that the latter should follow in his actions: the basis of the Spanish government's policy on the issue that had arisen in Santo Domingo was "the most perfect agreement" with France and Great Britain. The minister took special care to recommend to San Just the utmost caution, and in this regard, he indicated that it was not "in his sights to take the initiative in isolation for an action that, if necessary, would have to be joint." Meanwhile, Luzuriaga suggested to the commercial agent that, "associating himself opportunely with the efforts of the two aforementioned nations," he should maintain and, if possible, increase Spain's legitimate influence. The minister also informed San Just that Baralt had received full powers and had immediately begun "confidential negotiations on the treaty."(43) The instructions sent to said agent on January 22, 1855, via Havana must not have been very effective, since they arrived at their destination three months later, on April 24, while the immediately preceding communication, dated January 17, arrived within a more normal timeframe for the means of transportation of that time, and reached Santo Domingo on February 23.

The solutions considered by the Dominican government to address the country's complicated situation were limited to two alternatives: "A treaty with the United States, which affirmed the rejection of any Haitian invasion, or a protectorate shared by Spain, France, and England." The latter possibility, in Santana's opinion, made "the recognition of Santo Domingo's independence by Spain more urgent," as San Just informed the governor of Cuba on December 24, 1854. However, the governors of Cuba and Puerto Rico "aligned themselves with Juan Abril and favored Spain not recognizing the Dominican Republic or participating in the protectorate." In a letter he wrote to the Spanish ambassador in Paris on December 6, Abril expressed his opposition to the signing of a Dominican-Spanish recognition treaty, because it would leave the door open to another with the United States. De la Concha was also aware of the efforts Raybaud was continuing to make and therefore considered that, "thanks to the success of the French consul, recognition was unnecessary," as he explained to Luzuriaga on December 12, since he was primarily seeking to avoid problems with the United States.(44) With greater caution, and without openly expressing his opinion, on December 14, Norzagaray urged San Just "the advisability of proceeding with all due caution regarding the recognition of Dominican independence" by Spain.(45)

In January 1855, Lord Clarendon expressed to the American ambassador in London his government's good wishes for the United States, in an attempt to put aside differences and mend relations between the two countries. For his part, Ambassador Buchanan complained to the minister that, despite his words, the British attitude was so hostile to the signing of a Dominican-American agreement, to which Clarendon responded that in the future the United States would not be given any cause for complaint in a similar situation. This acquiescent stance by Great Britain resulted in a new scenario, where "the open opposition of Europeans to the United States was borne by Spain, as would soon be seen."(46)

On February 2, 1855, San Just sent the Minister of State an issue of the Gaceta of the Dominican Republic, which contained an article favorable to the claims of the United States regarding its establishment in that territory, and on April 4, Luzuriaga responded to the commercial agent in these terms:(47)

In view of this and the news that Your Majesty communicates [...], His Majesty's government has again addressed the governments of France and England to learn the course it intends to follow if the feared eventualities occur, and to proceed in agreement with those powers. In the meantime, Your Majesty will act [...] by liaising with the agents of England and France, and taking care to keep the Captain General of the island of Cuba informed of everything that occurs [...]. Your Majesty, for your part, will proceed with the utmost circumspection if a Spanish warship should ultimately appear in that port, and will ensure that the efforts undertaken to prevent General Cazneau's actions are successful, and that Spain appears to be supporting the efforts of England and France, and not promoting decisions aimed at countering the projects of the United States.

These instructions did not seem to indicate a significant change in the line followed by the Spanish government in the preceding months, but circumstances would eventually force it to take a much more active part in Dominican affairs. The situation was at a sort of impasse, from which none of the actors involved knew how to escape without provoking a more serious confrontation, once the option of a joint protectorate between the three European nations had been ruled out.

Great Britain, as can be deduced from the position adopted by Clarendon in response to the American ambassador's complaint, had already begun a strategic withdrawal, and France would soon follow suit, leaving Spain alone on the front line of fire, even against the wishes of its government, which had always been reluctant to play a leading role against the United States. The chargé d'affaires in Paris, José España y Puerta, gave unequivocal proof of the new French attitude in a communication addressed to the Minister of State on April 14, 1855, the contents of which were immediately reported to Saint-Just. The Spanish representative in Paris wrote the following:(48)

Mr. Thouvenel confirmed to me yesterday what he had incidentally told me on March 30th [...] regarding the plan, which had been attributed to the government of the United States, to seriously interfere in the affairs of Santo Domingo, as a result of the mission on which its plenipotentiary, General Cazneau, went to that island. In view of the explanations and assurances given by Mr. de Marcy to Mr. le Comte de Sartiges, France's representative in Washington, explanations and assurances that are believed to be sincere here, the government of this Emperor does not currently harbor any fear that any treaty contrary to the interests of France, Spain, and England will be concluded between the two republics [...]. Mr. Thouvenel therefore believes that new instructions are currently unnecessary, and, convinced that the conduct General Cazneau had observed in this matter had been disapproved by his government, he invited me to reassure His Majesty's government on this point, adding, and on this I call Your Excellency's attention because it may be appropriate to bear in mind the dispositions in which this cabinet finds itself with respect to that of Washington, for the settlement of the differences [...] between Spain and the North American republic, that it was very important for France to maintain the best relations, especially at present, with the United States, and not to show any kind of distrust with new instructions.

While in Europe the French and British governments had begun to modify their stance of open confrontation with the United States, Cazneau presented an ultimatum to the Dominican government on February 13, 1855. On the 15th, the government informed him that it had already "sent to Washington the observations that Congress had made on the draft treaty" and that it was awaiting a response. Naturally, the American general protested, considering the manner in which the Dominican authorities had transmitted these observations to his government to be irregular, which, in his opinion, demonstrated a lack of "goodwill among negotiators" on the Dominican side.(49) Thus, despite all his efforts and Santana's interest in signing a treaty with the United States, Cazneau's failure left the Washington administration no option but to dismiss him. However, this in no way meant abandoning the treaty or the acquisition of land in Samaná; rather, it was postponed for a better occasion. This came a few months later, in October 1855, when Marcy ordered the American commercial agent in Santo Domingo to act as special agent, in order to "obtain the naval station that Cazneau had been unable to obtain a year earlier."(50)

However, in the period between the end of those negotiations and the beginning of this one, a new factor had entered the Dominican diplomatic scene, a factor that would necessarily have a substantial impact on the course of events. On February 18, 1855, Rafael María Baralt, plenipotentiary of the Dominican government, and Luzuriaga, Minister of State, signed the Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, Navigation, and Extradition between the Dominican Republic and Spain in Madrid. It was ratified on May 9 by President Santana and on August 2 by Queen Isabella II, the ratifications being exchanged on August 19 of that year in El Escorial. When publishing the news of the Dominican-Spanish treaty, the Revista de Ambos Mundos noted that for its signing:(51)

We have had in view, on the one hand, those that Spain has celebrated with other republics of America, and on the other, those that the Dominican Republic has made with France and England: this treaty, we say, founded on the strictest reciprocity, consists of forty-seven articles and is, without a doubt, the most complete, as well as the most advantageous to the contracting parties of all those that have been celebrated until now between Spain and its already emancipated colonial possessions [...]. The recognition is explicit and unconditional, as the Dominican Republic needs and has the right to ask of it in order to legalize its political situation and its now legitimate and undisputed possession of the territory.

This treaty, therefore, differed greatly from the models under which the rest of the Spanish-American treaties can be grouped. While it certainly included all the clauses that made up these treaties, it also included many new ones,(52) making it by far the most extensive of them all.

However, its importance lies not so much in the prolixity of its provisions, but in the consequences that the recognition itself had on Spain's conduct toward the Dominican Republic, especially after the arrival in Santo Domingo of the First Consul, Antonio María Segovia, in December 1855. Indeed, he immediately launched an intense campaign against the Dominican-American treaty, whose ratification was suspended due to pressure from the Spanish diplomat on the Santo Domingo government. The consul's interventionist policy even led to the fall of Santana in October 1856, who was replaced by Báez, as Segovia believed the latter would be much more favorable to Spain's interests due to his opposition to a rapprochement between the Dominican Republic and the United States.

This episode is known in Dominican historiography as the Segovia Registration, which consisted of the irregular naturalization of a considerable number of Dominican supporters of Báez, by registering them as Spanish citizens in the consular registration registry, to protect them from possible reprisals by the Santana regime. According to authors such as Juan Daniel Balcácer and García Arévalo, what Segovia did was simply proceed "to open registration books at the consulate headquarters so that anyone who wished to adopt Spanish nationality could do so," basing his actions "on a capricious interpretation of Article 7 of the Dominican-Spanish treaty."(53)

However, both historians overlooked the fact that there was a certain lack of clarity regarding the nationality of some residents of the Dominican Republic who declared themselves Spanish, a controversial issue that had been dragging on for some time, as will be seen later. Therefore, it would be necessary to analyze whether the aforementioned article of the treaty was in fact as clear as the circumstances required, or whether, on the contrary, it left too much room for individual interpretation, although it is possible to think that it was more likely the latter.(54)

In fact, on the same day that the new Minister of State, Juan Zavala de la Puente, congratulated Baralt after receiving news of the treaty's approval by the Dominican Senate, the newspaper La España, very close to the Moderate Party, published an editorial expressing the numerous questions raised by the complex Dominican political situation. The author first pointed out that it was necessary to regularize Dominican-Spanish diplomatic relations as soon as possible, "in order to avoid in the future the unpleasant quarrels and disputes" caused by confusion and complications regarding nationality. The newspaper's editorialist then summarized the latest events in the Dominican Republic, in which two men named Dalmau and Camoin, who were apparently Spanish citizens, were allegedly involved. Furthermore, he commented on San Just's difficult position in the whole matter, since, assuming that both Dalmau and Camoin were Spanish, the commercial agent had sent a note to the Dominican Minister of Foreign Affairs, protesting "against the execution of one and the imprisonment of the other.” In his response, the minister maintained that the people on whose behalf San Just had filed his claim were Dominican citizens, but the agent did not find these clarifications satisfactory and returned "to the charge with even greater energy than at the beginning."(55)

The aforementioned editorial in La España also emphasized that the nationality conflict must be addressed urgently, given that, if not properly resolved, it threatened to have very serious consequences for the Spanish Antilles. Precisely, the security and protection of these possessions were the main objective pursued by the Madrid government through the signing of the treaty with the Dominican Republic. The editorialist concluded with these words:(56)

We are far from disapproving [...] the zeal of our agents in defense of Spanish subjects who find themselves harassed or abused in a foreign country; but above all, it is essential that their Spanish status be sufficiently proven, so that the national flag does not serve as a shelter for the excesses of adventurers who seek their advancement in civil disputes to which they should be completely alien [...]. It would therefore be very sensitive for a commercial agent, probably without precise instructions to handle matters of such a delicate nature, to establish doctrines and precedents that foreigners could invoke against us. Therefore, we insist once again on the need to resolve these matters promptly, establishing clearly and without leaving room for interpretation, the nationality of the appropriate registry opened for this purpose.

Thus, instead of calming down after the signing of the treaty, the issue of the registration of Spanish citizens further soured relations between the Dominican government and San Just, to the point that the latter openly expressed his indignation in dispatches to his superiors. For example, in a communication sent at the end of May to the governor of Puerto Rico, the agent denounced the persecution of all things Spanish carried out by the Santana regime, asserting that once the mask was thrown off, it did not stop, but rather that every day a new conflict arose that increased "the protocol of the already consummated outrages." San Just justified his harsh language given the seriousness of the events and focused his criticism on the situation of many Spaniards, who upon arriving in Dominican territory had been forced to serve in the army. They therefore demanded the protection of Spain's commercial agent in Santo Domingo. He accused the Dominican government of refusing to issue them passports and even of holding them in custody so they could not inform him of their situation. Furthermore, the government even threatened several Spanish families for enrolling, warning them that they would not be able to obtain their passports and that if they did so, he would expel them from the country. At the end of such a list of offenses that the Santana regime had inflicted on the Spanish residents of the Dominican Republic, San Just vented his feelings by issuing the following opinions regarding the ruling group of that country, as well as regarding the power that, according to him, defended and sustained it, that is, the United States: “It is unheard of [...] what is happening in this country, governed by a group of men without faith or honor, and if the Spanish nation is not prepared to set an example, I cannot conceive of a more propitious occasion that could arise [...]. However, Santana remains unfazed because he can count on the strength of the armed slave traders.”(57)

This disturbing news was transmitted by the governor of Puerto Rico to Madrid, where it arrived in mid-July, still with enough time to at least postpone either the ratification or the promulgation of the treaty, pending a satisfactory clarification of these events. However, this postponement did not occur, and the Spanish government carried out the necessary procedures according to the planned schedule without any alteration. Indeed, after submitting a bill to the Cortes on July 2 requesting authorization to ratify the treaty it had signed with the government of the Dominican Republic, the last remaining requirement for it to become law was its official promulgation, which occurred on July 26. Ten days earlier, Zavala informed San Just that Antonio María Segovia had been appointed consul general and chargé d'affaires of Spain in Santo Domingo.(58)

On the other hand, De los Santos, who headed the Political Directorate of the Ministry of State, responded in August to San Just, who had reported in several communications about the Dominican government's attitude toward the children of Spanish citizens, who were forced to take up arms from the age of 14. De los Santos instructed the agent to vigorously protest such abuses and stressed the need to make such demands to protect all individuals who were truly Spanish, as well as to remain firm in the face of the Dominican government's persecution of them.(59)

Under these circumstances, it seems unsurprising that the Spanish government maintained its initial plan to establish diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic, despite the complications San Just raised, believing it essential to more effectively influence Santana's policy and thus try to hinder his rapprochement with the United States. In fact, the defense of Spanish interests in Cuba and Puerto Rico against the ever-ambitious North American power was precisely what had led the Madrid government to strengthen ties with Santo Domingo. Consequently, it seemed illogical to thwart the plan, already underway, simply because of a succession of obstacles whose significance was, in any case, undoubtedly much less important than Spain's primary objective, which was, of course, to preserve its valuable Antillean possessions at all costs.

In short, the history of the Dominican Republic from its independence from Haiti in 1844 until at least 1871, when the attempt to annex Dominican territory to the United States failed, is defined by a series of basic factors. The most decisive of these was undoubtedly the structural crisis of the new state as a consequence of its political instability and economic weakness. This critical situation led the country's various governments to seek assistance from a foreign power, through protectorates or the establishment of diplomatic relations, or even, as happened between 1861 and 1865, through its reincorporation into Spain, whose main objective in the Caribbean was, above all, to retain Cuba and Puerto Rico.(60)

The second element that marked this period was the constant threat to Dominican independence by Haiti, which materialized in several invasions of the neighboring country against its territory until the truce of 1856, after which the executive branch of Port-au-Prince began to employ other, more subtle tactics to undermine Dominican independence. Thus, the efforts to obtain a lasting peace agreement between the two countries on the island, mediated by France, Great Britain, and the United States, later joined by Spain, were merely the beginning of a prolonged period of external interference in Dominican politics.

This interventionism was fueled, first, by the international rivalry between these powers, especially between the European powers on the one hand and North America on the other. Second, external interference was also largely stimulated by a Haitian threat that, while sometimes very real, was often conveniently magnified by the Santo Domingo executive branch for its own ends. Third, this foreign intervention was also due to the ongoing internal power struggles, which opened the way even more easily to the ever-increasing involvement of the various diplomatic agents in these struggles. Finally, the beginning of a certain consolidation of Dominican sovereignty, although still with numerous limitations even in relatively recent times, did not occur until 1924, when the American troops who had occupied Dominican territory in 1916 abandoned that part of the island after an intense campaign of nationalist vindication.

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